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1. Introduction
Government support of agriculture is currently one of the most discussed
areas of economic policies of European Union (EU) and its member coun-
tries. A majority of the EU interventions and regulations of agriculture are
present within the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In
addition to CAPprograms there are also National Aid programs in EU mem-
ber countries. One of themost important National Aid programs in theCzech
agricultural industry is for the support of commercially provided agricul-
tural loans. This support is administered by a special fund called the Sup-
porting and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund (SGAFF). In Czech
it is known under the acronym PGRLF, which stands for PodpÛrn˘ a ga-
ranãní rolnick˘ a lesnick˘ fond.
In this paper we first briefly describe the operations of this SGAFF fund
and then we concentrate on the questions of its funding and its budgetary
costs. Subsequently we complement this empirical analysis with a theore-
tical analysis of the budgetary costs of different government programs of
agricultural credit support. 
The problem of agricultural credit support is addressed by a number of
papers in both academic and policy-oriented literature. A comprehensive
overview of credit policies is provided by Barry (1995). He analyzes public
credit programs in U.S. agriculture both from the empirical and the theo-
retical point of view. The credit provision in U.S. agriculture is also dis-
cussed by Doucha (1993). The credit guarantees are further described by
Navajas (2001), who discusses credit-guarantee schemes used by farmers
or small enterprises and by Gudger (1998), who concentrates on the use of
credit guarantees in agriculture. In thecontext of theCzech Republic, theac-
tivities of SGAFF were empirically investigated by Janda, Sklenkova, and
Vigner (1997) and by Janda and Cajka (2006). The agricultural policies rele-
vant to transition countries in comparison to CAP are described by Pokriv-
cak and Ciacian (2004).
The theoretical model in this paper is written in the tradition of the asym-
metric information approach to the explanation of credit-market imperfec-
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Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and others to explain credit rationing and other
imperfections as a rational, equilibrium-generating response to adverse se-
lection problems attributable to asymmetric information between lenders
and borrowers. Of the classic papers dealing with credit contracts under
asymmetric information conditions those of Bester (1985) and Besanko and
Thakor (1987) may be mentioned as relevant to the theoretical part of our
paper. A comprehensive recent treatment of these theories is provided by
Tirole (2006) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) on a general contract-the-
ory level, by Freixas and Rochet (1997) and Bebczuk (2003) in the banking
and finance environment context and by Cosci (1993) in a specialized set-
ting of the credit-rationing problem. Gale (1990, 1991), Smith and Stutzer
(1989) and more recently Janda (2003, 2005) use this contract-theory ap-
proach to analyze government interventions in credit markets. The general
problems of dealing with firms in financial distress under asymmetric in-
formation conditions are addressed by Kolecek (2005) and Knot and Vy-
chodil (2005). 
2. Government Support of Agriculture through SGAFF
The SGAFF was set up on the basis of a Czech government resolution in
1993 as a joint-stock company whose sole shareholder is the Czech Ministry
of Agriculture. The main activity of the SGAFF is the provision of interest-
-rate subsidies and loan guarantees. This provision is done through a num-
ber of specialized programs targeted either to a particular activity or to
a particular type of recipients. More details about the creation and goals of
credit support are provided in articles by Horãicová (1993) and Horãicová
and Va‰ková (1994). The evolution of the activities of SGAFF over the years
of its operation is captured in the Table 1. The term “volume of mediated
loans” used in this table means the total size of all loans supported by
SGAFF. 
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TABLE 1 Applications and Mediated Loans
Year Number of Of those Approval Volume of loans
applications approved ratio mediated
(CZK million)
1994 2 605 2 388 0.92 6 235
1995  2 945 2 739 0.93 10 129
1996  3 426 3 252 0.95 14 847
1997  2 540 2 340 0.92 14 622
1998  1 934 1 735 0.90 9 299
1999  1 746  1 493  0.86  7 695
2000  1 539  1 425  0.93  5 324
2001  1 723  1 671  0.97  6 369
2002  1 993  1 920  0.96  7 361
2003  1 802  1 723  0.96  6 088
2004  2 657  2 471  0.93  7 963
Total  24 910  23 157  0.93  95 932
Source: (PGRLF, 2005)The very high approval ratio in Table 1 is caused by the design of
the SGAFF activities. SGAFF never intended to serve as a screening insti-
tution which would evaluate the quality of the submitted projects and which
would subsequently make a decision on accepting or rejecting the project
based on its economic viability. The SGAFF, as a matter of policy, leaves
the economic analysis of the business projects entirely to commercial banks.
In the event that the project is approved by the commercial bank for fi-
nancing, the SGAFF essentially automatically provides support for the pro-
ject as long as the project satisfies the generally stipulated conditions and
rules of SGAFF programs. This means that the rejected applications for
SGAFF support were those which somehow violated these SGAFF rules.
This policy explains the low administrative burden, simplicity and trans-
parency of SGAFF operations and the enthusiastic reception of SGAFF both
by farmers and bankers. 
There are currently two groups of SGAFF main programs: investment
and non-investment loans programs, which are supplemented by the Youth
program. This supplementary program, which may be used by young farm-
ers only in conjunction with some of the main programs, increases the rates
of support provided under the main programs. The non-investment loans
support is currently represented only by the Interest Burden Compensa-
tion Program. The goal of this program is to compensate for the interest
rate difference between agricultural loans and loans provided in other in-
dustries. The investment-loans group consists of five programs. Three of
these are designed according to the production vertical line as the Farmer,
Processor, and Distribution Organization Programs. The Hygiene Program
is oriented toward the improvement of veterinary and hygienic conditions
of processing animal and plant products according to EU and Czech regu-
lations. The Land Investment Program supports land purchases for agri-
cultural operations. 
This description of SGAFF programs indicates that the term “Forestry”
in the name of the SGAFF actually has no real meaning as far as the cur-
rently supported activities are concerned. SGAFF supports only agriculture
and the activities currently related to agriculture. In the past SGAFF also
operated some programs related to the non-production functions of agri-
culture, to multi-functionality and rural development, and to forestry. 
3.  The Budget Impact of SGAFF
3.1  SGAFF Funding
The funding for SGAFF is based on two main sources – the shares port-
folio and the annual contribution from the state budget. At the time of its
foundation SGAFF was endowed with portfolio shares of agricultural or
agriculture-related enterprises. These shares were obtained in two tran-
ches. In 1994 SGAFF obtained from the National Property Fund shares in
the nominal value of CZK 3.8 billion in the first wave of voucher privati-
zation. Janda (1996) estimates the market value of this initial portfolio of
SGAFF to range from a minimum of CZK 1.6 billion to a maximum of
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from the National Property Fund shares in the nominal value of
CZK 1.865 billion in the second wave of voucher privatization. At the time
of their transfer to SGAFF, the market value of these shares was approxi-
mately one half of their nominal value. SGAFF did not obtain the shares
completely free of charge. It had to pay one one-thousandth (1/1000) of their
nominal value, i.e. CZK 5.665 million. The initial SGAFF portfolio is de-
scribed in more detail by Janda (1994).  
The most important source of SGAFF funding is the annual appropria-
tions from the state budget. The time series of these appropriations is pro-
vided in Table 2. When evaluating the dynamics of this time series, it should
be kept in mind that thesharp upswing in 1997 was partly caused by thespe-
cial appropriation of CZK 750 million for the provision of flood relief for
farmers in areas damaged by flooding in summer 1997. The steady decrease
in annual government contributions, which has been especially pronounced
since 2001, is partly connected with the decrease in the volume of support
extended to farmers by SGAFF, caused in part by the argument that SGAFF
has sufficient capital, and thus it does not need such large annual govern-
ment contributions. 
The comparison with Table 1 shows that the period of large annual con-
tributions from the state budget from 1996 to 1998 corresponds to the pe-
riod of the highest activity of the fund in terms of volume of loans supported
by SGAFF. While the volume of supported loans in 2004 is approximately
half that of the peak year of 1996, SGAFF’s share in the total support of
Czech agriculture, shown in Table 3, decreased over the years much more
significantly from 35 % in 1994 to 3.5 % in 2003. 
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TABLE 2  Appropriations to SGAFF from the State Budget
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Appropriation 
(CZK  bilion)  2.60 2.10 2.77 4.21 3.61 2.39 2.18 1.31 1.25 0.72 0.63 0.60
Change 
(%)    –  –19.2 31.9  52.0 –14.3  –33.8 –8.8 –39.9 –4.6 –42.4  –12.5 –4.8
Source: Zákon o státním rozpoãtu (Czech State Budget Act) (1994–2005)
TABLE 3  Government Support to Agriculture
Type of expenditure
1994 1997 2000  2003
CZK mil. %  CZK mil. %  CZK mil. %  CZK mil. %
SGAFF   2 654  35.25  3 458  28.18  2 175  10.92  720  3.51
Market interventions   1 925  25.56  2 404  19.59  2 420  12.15  6 730  32.79
Direct subsidies   2 139  28.41  3 500  28.52  10 848  54.45  7 711  37.57
Research   448  5.95  418  3.41  441  2.21  586  2.85
Tax relief   264  3.51  1 664  13.56  822  4.13  1 597  7.78 
Others   100  1.33  827  6.74  3 217  16.15  3 182  15.50 
Total   7 530  100.00  12 271  100.00  19 923  100.00  20 526  100.00
Sources: (Ministerstvo zemûdûlství âR, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004) 3.2  The Main Budgetary Costs of SGAFF
From the point of view of the Czech government, the budgetary costs of
SGAFF are equal to the annual contributions provided to SGAFF from
the state budget through the Ministry of Agriculture, which are given in
Table 2. From the economic point of view, these amounts are only transfers
from the state budget to the SGAFF budget. SGAFF is not obliged to spend
the funds provided by the government in a given year for credit support
during that year. From the logic of guarantees it follows that the guaran-
tee institution has to keep enough funds to be able to cover amounts due
over the whole duration of the loan. Therefore SGAFF has to have suffi-
cient reserve funds available. According to (PGRLF, 2005, p. 15), the value
of SGAFF portfolio reached CZK 6.5 billion by December 31, 2004. The fu-
ture liabilities of the SGAFF have to be compared against these assets. 
According to (PGRLF, 2005, p. 17), as of December 31, 2004 the contracted
guarantees associated with outstanding loans were CZK 7,239 million. 
On the same date, the total volume of subsidies granted and associated 
with outstanding loans was CZK 5,586 million, of which approximately
CZK 3,849 million had already been paid out. To answer the question about
the quality of the match between the value of portfolio and future liabili-
ties, the term structure of these liabilities and the expected rate of default
must be known. 
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TABLE 4  Supported Loans According to Their Duration
Loan  Number of Of which Loan Guarantees Subsidy Subsidies
duration  applications approved  amount amount in total paid out by
(CZK million) (CZK million) (CZK million) December 
31, 2004
(CZK million)
up to 1 yr. 7 037  6 989  32 097  5 476  2 032  2 028
up to 2 yrs. 2 844  2 825  9 533  3 399  1 179  1 101
up to 3 yrs. 1 554  1 536  3 900  1 168  682  678
up to 4 yrs. 4 362  4 327  13 594  4 201  3 183  3 108
up to 5 yrs. 1 931  1 898  6 461  2 056  1 394  1 176
up to 6 yrs. 3 121  3 064  13 563  4 816  3 648  3 127
up to 7 yrs. 1 169  1 165  6 941  4 032  2 609  2 319
up to 8 yrs. 656  642  5 044  2 851  2 022  1 758
up to 9 yrs. 119  117  1 265  584  503  390
up to 10 yrs. 144  140  1 855  899  800  559
up to 11 yrs. 16  16  257  173  164  124
up to 12 yrs. 6  6  64  43  57  42
up to 13 yrs. 3  3  22  0  12  10
up to 14 yrs. 6  6  23  4  11  2
up to 15 yrs. 18  18  107  18  49  12
up to 17 yrs. 1  1  20  0  14  4
up to 19 yrs. 5  5  7  0  4  0.02
up to 20 yrs. 18  18  43  0  22  0.38
unspecified   1 900  381  1 135  148  67  32
Total   24 910  23 157  95 932  29 869  18 453  16 469
Source: (PGRLF, 2005) Unfortunately we do not have available data about thecurrent term struc-
ture of the future liabilities of SGAFF with respect to contracted future in-
terest-rate subsidies and outstanding amounts of guarantees. However, we
have available the aggregated historical data about the duration structure
of all loans supported by SGAFF since its foundation until the end of 2004.
This information is provided in Table 4. The duration data in this table show
that the majority of the supported loans are for two years at most. When
measured by loan amount, the one- and two-year loans account for 44 % of
all loans supported. Only a very small share (5 %) of the loan amount be-
longs to long-term loans with the duration of nine or more years. Therefore,
based on historical data we could say that the major expected cost and risk
exposure of SGAFF is concentrated on a short-term horizon of up to two
years with the rest essentially distributed in the medium term of three to
eight years. 
As we argued in previous paragraphs, the annual transfers from the state
budget to SGAFF do not represent the actual costs of SGAFF. It would be
quite a complex problem to calculate the true economic costs of SGAFF if
we considered all direct and indirect costs. In this paper we will restrict our
attention to only the direct costs. Nevertheless, even the quantification of
all direct costs of SGAFF would not be an easy task even if we had avail-
able the internal accounting data of SGAFF. Since we do not have access to
these proprietary data, we focus only on the direct cost of the main activi-
ties of SGAFF in this paper. 
As we have already mentioned, the principal activity of SGAFF is the sup-
port of agricultural commercial loans through interest-rate subsidies and
guarantees. Therefore themain budgetary costs of SGAFF are thepayments
of interest-rate subsidies and guarantee payments for defaulted loans.
These payments are given in Table 5 for the period 1994–2004. 
It can be seen in Table 5 that both the total cost of guarantee payments
and the number of defaulted guaranteed loans increased sharply during
the period 1998–2000. The reaction to this trend was the steady decrease
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TABLE 5  Guarantees and Subsidies Contracted and Paid
Year  Guarantees Number  Guarantee Subsidies Paid out from
contracted  of defaults payments by contracted the subsidies contracted
(CZK million)  SGAFF  (CZK million) (CZK million)
(CZK million) 
1994   1 544  0  0  1 259  286 
1995   4 436  9  28  2 417  722 
1996   8 265  19  69  4 337  1 819 
1997   4 788  61  170  2 964  2 702 
1998   2 307  119  677  1 959  2 682 
1999   1 138  191  811  1 394  2 208 
2000   876  181  723  754  1 606 
2001   1 129  99  308  992  1 333 
2002   1 365  60  109  1 008  1 267 
2003   1 714  36  131  606  964 
2004   2 306  40  176  763  880 
total   29 869  815  3 201  18 453  16 469
Source: (PGRLF, 2005) in the size of contracted guarantees with the minimum achieved in 2000.
By comparing the total guarantee payments with the total volume of gua-
rantees contracted since the beginning of SGAFF until the end 2004, we
find out that the average share of paid guarantees with respect to the gua-
rantees provided in the contracts over the years of SGAFF’s operation was
slightly higher than 10 percent. As long as we take these historical data as
agood prediction for thefuture, we may expect that thecost of CZK7.239bil-
lion in outstanding guarantees as of December 31, 2004 will be around
CZK 0.7 billion in terms of expected actual guarantee payments by SGAFF.
When we add the CZK 1.737 billion of outstanding contracted interest-rate
subsidies, we see that the CZK 6.5 billion value of the SGAFF portfolio is
sufficiently high to support themajor mission of SGAFF regardless of theope-
rational and institutional costs of running SGAFF operations and adminis-
tration. 
Our prediction of the expected guarantee payments could be taken as
a reasonable estimate for the future. After the lesson with the increasing
guarantee payments was learned by SGAFF during the 1990s, SGAFF is
more careful and conservative in the provision of guarantees. SGAFF also
contracted outside agencies to manage the defaulted loan payments so that
the actual guarantee payments could be minimized. 
Our comparison of the value of the portfolio and expected cost of core
SGAFF activities explains the reasons of decreasing government budget
contributions presented in Table 2. It also explains the insistence of
the Czech Ministry of Agriculture on SGAFF taking part in additional sup-
porting activities in addition to its main mission of providing credit gua-
rantees and interest-rate subsidies. For 2006, SGAFF will not receive any
government budget contribution. At the time of writing this paper there are
no indications available whether this is only a one-year measure or whether
this is the end of the government’s budget support of SGAFF. 
SGAFF obviously also has operational and administrative costs connected
with its functioning as an institution and the financial costs of active ma-
nagement of its portfolio. It also incurs significant costs connected with
a number of ad hoc activities imposed upon it by its sole shareholder –
the Czech Ministry of Agriculture. These ad hoc activities range from
the purchases of receivables to be received by primary agricultural pro-
ducers from processing firms during 1994–1999 to the flood-relief loans in
connection with the1997 and 2002 floods. Themost recent example is thein-
volvement of SGAFF in agricultural insurance support since 2004. This sup-
port of agriculture insurance seems to be a lasting activity which could be-
come one of the major SGAFF lines of business. 
While the Czech Supreme Audit Office (Nejvy‰‰í kontrolní úﬁad, 1997,
1999) and Silar (1996) mentioned and criticized a number of inefficiencies
connected both with the main activities of SGAFF and all those supple-
mentary activities, we have left all these legitimate concerns aside in this
paper and restricted our attention to the interest-rate subsidies and gua-
rantee payments summarized in Table 5. We will continue to maintain this
focus on guarantees and interest-rate subsidies in the following sections, in
which we will switch our focus from empirical investigation to the theore-
tical mode of analysis. 
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In this section we incorporate the problem of budget costs of government
intervention into the simplified version of the model of the credit market
under asymmetric information developed by Janda (2003, 2005). This
abridged model concentrates on inefficiencies caused by credit rationing 
and therefore does not deal with efficiency losses caused by collateralized
debt contracts, which are analyzed by Janda (2003, 2005).  
The focus on the credit-rationing aspect of the information asymmetry
between lender and borrower is based on the Czech agricultural-policy
makers’ and agricultural economists’ perception of the agricultural credit-
-market situation at the time the Czech SGAFF was created. The major
concern leading to the establishment of SGAFF was the prevailing opi-
nion that Czech farmers had been rationed out of the credit market. At
the beginning of the 1990s commercial banks were not willing to lend to
farmers since they were considered as a too-risky client group – see (Silar,
1996). 
There are two types of risk-neutral borrowers in this model, indexed as
Type 1 and Type 2. These two types are distinguished by their probability
of successfully finishing their projects, denoted as  0 <  1 <  2 < 1, and by
their reservation utilities, denoted as  b1 < b2. The probability that the ran-
dom borrower facing a lender is Type 1 is  . The only informational asym-
metry in the model is that ex ante lenders and the government do not know
the borrower’s type. 
The borrower can either undertake one risky project, which yields y
in the case of success and 0 in the case of failure, or he obtains the reser-
vation utility  bi, i    1,2 . When the project is completed, the outcome
of the project is freely observed by the borrower, lender, and govern-
ment. 
In order to undertake the project, the borrower has to borrow one unit of
money from the lender. The unit cost of funds for risk-neutral lenders en-
gaged in Bertrand competition is denoted as  . The contracts between
the lender and borrower are standard debt contracts. This means that in
the case of success of the project the lender receives a constant repay-
ment R. Each lender offers two types of contract. Each contract is a pair
( i, Ri),   i    1,2  where Ri is the required repayment and  i is the credit-
-rationing probability, i.e. the probability that the application of the bor-
rower who chooses this contract will be approved. 
The expected utility of a borrower of type i who applies for a contract de-
signed for a borrower of a type j is given as incremental expected utility: 
Uij =   j [ i (y – Rj)] + (1 –  j) bi  – bi
which may be simplified as 
Uij =  j [ i (y – Rj) – bi] (1)
This definition of utility function leads naturally to the participation con-
straint in the form 
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We assume that each project is socially efficient, that is  iy > bi +  . This
assumption loosely corresponds to one important policy reason given as
a justification for implementing the Czech SGAFF program. At the begin-
ning of the 1990s the Czech agricultural policymakers and economists ar-
gued that direct provision of subsidies from the government to farmers may
encourage inefficient projects. Therefore the policy response was to shift
the responsibility for the choice of projects to be financed to commercial
banks. In the framework of our model this means that we assume that
the banks had already screened out and eliminated all the obviously bad
projects. Therefore our model analysis corresponds to the second decision
stage, when such a complete preliminary screening had already been ac-
complished by banks. 
The government may attempt to reduce theinefficiencies created by credit
rationing by three types of interventions, which were motivated by the pro-
grams used by the Czech SGAFF. 
Under the proportional guarantees program, the government guarantees
the payment of the fraction  i of the contracted loan repayment in the case
of zero return from a project. The expected profit to the lender is 
Bi =  i [ i Ri + (1 –  i)  iRi –  ] (2)
Under the lump-sum guarantees program the government guarantees
the payment of an exogenously determined lump-sum gi in the case of zero
return from a project. The expected profit to the lender is 
Bi =  i [ i Ri + (1 –  i) gi –  ] (3)
The last considered type of intervention is an interest-rate subsidy si,
which is paid only in the case of a project’s success, as opposed to guaran-
tees, which are paid in the case of failure. While the subsidy reduces the in-
terest rate paid by the borrower, we can treat it analytically as an exoge-
nous supplement to a repayment to the lender. Therefore the expected profit
to the lender is 
Bi =  i [ i (Ri + si) –  ] (4)
In accordance with the practice of SGAFF, these supports are provided by
the government free of charge. This means that the borrower does not have
to pay any guarantee (or subsidy) fee to the government, which in the Czech
case is represented by SGAFF. This is in sharp contrast to the usual com-
mercially provided guarantees. 
5. The Optimization Problem and Its Solution
Since the focus of our attention in this paper is on the budgetary costs of
government intervention, we only briefly state the solutions of the model
under three different considered interventions here. The detailed solution
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(2003, 2005). Those papers consider our three types of government inter-
ventions but do not deal with their government budgetary impact, which is
the point of interest in this article. In this paper we will analyze only the si-
tuation when the values of the reservation utilities and likelihood of success 
b2  2 parameters are such that ––   ––. This situation corresponds to the tran-
b1  1
sition-economy case in the terminology of Janda (2003, 2005).
The lender under asymmetric information does not know ex ante the risk
class of a borrower. Due to competition from other lenders, each lender at-
tempts to offer the best possible conditions to each type of borrower. If lump-
-sum guarantees are provided, the maximization problem of the lender is
given by: 
max M =  U11 + (1 –  )U22
 
 1,R1   2,R2
=   1[ 1(y – R1) – b1] + (1 –  ) 2[ 2(y – R2) – b2]
s.t. 
 1[ 1(y – R1) – b1]    2[ 1(y – R2) – b1]  (IC1)
 2[ 2(y – R2) – b2]    1[ 2(y – R1) – b2]  (IC2)
Uii   0                           (IRi)
0    i   1
 iRi + (1 –  i) gi –   = 0 (5)
i    1,2 
Equation (5) is a zero-profit condition for lenders, which explicitly pro-
hibits cross-subsidization. This means that it is not possible for lenders to
suffer a loss on a contract to one type of borrower and to enjoy a positive
profit on a contract with another type of borrower. The zero-profit constraint
restricts the ability of the lender to offer the most attractive contract to
the borrower when the lender competes for the borrower with other lenders. 
The solution of this problem is two different contracts  ( i
*, Ri
*) one of-
fered to the high-risk borrower and one to the low-risk borrower. Therefore
the initial ex-ante informational asymmetry disappears at the moment
when the borrower reveals his type by accepting one of the offered contracts.
Based on this ex-post revelation of the borrower type, the government is
able to target its support by providing different subsidies or guarantees for
different contracts offered by the lender. 
When proportional guarantees are used, the lender’s zero-profit condi-
tion (5) is replaced by 
 iRi + (1 –  i) iRi –   = 0 (6)
When interest-rate subsidies are used thelender’szero-profit condition(5)
is replaced by 
425 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 56, 2006, ã. 9-10 i(Ri + si) –   = 0 (7)
By solving this optimization problem we determine the following charac-
teristics of the optimum solution. 
For government support implemented through lump-sum guarantees,
the contracts for high-risk (indexed as borrower 1) and low-risk borrowers
(indexed as borrower 2) are given by: 
  – (1 –  i)gi  i
* = 1, Ri
* = –––––––––––,    i    1,2  (8)
 i
 1y –   – b1 + (1 –  1)g1  2
* = –––––––––––––––––––––––– (9)
 1          1(1–  2)
 1y – ––   – b1 + ––––––– g2  2                               2
For government support implemented through proportional guarantees,
the contracts for high-risk (indexed as borrower 1) and low-risk borrowers
(indexed as borrower 2) are given by: 
 
 1
* = 1, Ri
* = ––––––––––––,    i    1,2  (10)
 i  + (1 –  i) i
 1 
 1y – b1 – ––––––––––––
 1 + (1 –  1) 1  2
* = –––––––––––––––––––––––– (11)
 1 
 1y – b1 – ––––––––––––
 2 + (1 –  2) 2
For government support implemented through interest-rate subsidies
the contracts for high-risk (indexed as borrower 1) and low-risk borrowers
(indexed as borrower 2) are given by: 
 
 1
* = 1, Ri
* = –– – si,    i    1,2  (12)
 i 
 1y –   – b1 +  1s1  2
* = –––––––––––––––––– (13)
 1  1y – ––   – b1 +  1s2  2
In the next section we will use these equilibrium values of the required
repayments Ri
* and credit-rationing probabilities   i
*, i    1,2  to evaluate
the budget cost of different types of interventions. Our analysis will be
purely theoretical and qualitative. We leave the possible calibration of
the model and numerical estimations for future research. 
6. Budget Cost of Interventions
From the welfare point of view the absolute volume of government money
spent on the interventions really does not matter as long as we take it as
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any formal considerations of the cost of obtaining money for the govern-
ment’s budget, nor do we model the cost of transferring money from the go-
vernment’s budget to the hands of lenders and borrowers. This means that
we do not answer the question of whether (taking into account the cost of
obtaining and transferring money) it is socially efficient for the government
to engage in credit-market interventions. In accordance with the situation
of the Czech agricultural policies and government decision-making, we take
it as a given fact that the government decides to undertake a credit-mar-
ket intervention based on political reasons. Nevertheless, we assume that
the government would like to achieve its goals in improving the efficiency
of credit markets with as few government budget outlays as possible. (This
is a very obvious assumption, but it is not trivial. It could be possible that
for some political and economic reasons the government would pursue so-
me additional goals besides improving the efficiency of credit markets and
those goals would not be compatible with minimization of the govern-
ment’s budgetary cost.) Consequently, the government is very interested in
the expected budget impact of its interventions, which is the subject of
the following analysis. This means that we compare here only relative effi-
ciency (from the budgetary cost perspective) of different credit market in-
terventions. 
The expected budgetary cost of different forms of government interven-
tions Gm, m     , g, s  are given by the following formulas: 
Proportional guarantees: 
                                                                  
G  =   1
* (1 –  1)[ 1 ––––––––––––] + (1 –  ) 2
* (1 –  2)[ 2 ––––––––––––]
 1 + (1 –  1) 1                                                           2 + (1 –  2) 2
(14)
Lump-sum guarantees: 
Gg =   1
* (1 –  1)g1 + (1 –  ) 2
* (1 –  2)g2 (15)
Interest-rate subsidies: 
Gs =   1
* 1s1 + (1 –  ) 2
* 2s2 (16)
Under the assumptions of our model in the first-best full information case
all the projects would be implemented. This means that asymmetric infor-
mation leading to equilibrium credit rationing generates welfare loss. 
In the remainder of this section we consider the following scenario. We
assume that the government determines the target level of credit rationing
which the government would like to achieve. To reach this target level,
the government is able to use different credit-support instruments. 
Given a required target level of efficiency (determined by the level of  2
*)
denoted as   h, we can determine the level of intervention m1(m2,  h), where
m     , g, s , is needed to achieve this required target. 
We will compute these levels of intervention and subsequently we will use
them to compare the budget impact of different types of interventions un-
der the condition of the same achieved target level of efficiency. 
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a proportional guarantee to a high-risk borrower  1 as a function of the tar-
get level of credit rationing  h and the proportional guarantee to a low-risk
borrower  2: 
 1                                                  1 
 h  1y – b1 – ––––––––––––  =  1y – b1 – ––––––––––––––––––
 2 + (1 –  2) 2                                  1 + (1 –  1) 1( 2,  h)
which leads to: 
 1 
 1   –   1y – b1 –  h[ 1y – b1 – ––––––––––––]    2 + (1 –  2) 2  1( 2,  h) = –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– (17)
 1 
(1 –  1)   1y – b1 –  h[ 1y – b1 – ––––––––––––]   2 + (1 –  2) 2
The size of a lump-sum guarantee for a high-risk borrower g1, given as
af unction of the targeted level of credit rationing  h and the lump-sum
guarantee for a low-risk borrower g2, is obtained from equation (9) as: 
 1                       1(1 –  2)
 h  1y – ––   – b1 + –––––––– g2  –  1y +   + b1  2                                2 g1(g2, h) = –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– (18)
1 –  1
Similarly, the interest-rate subsidy for a high-risk borrower, given as
a function of  h and s2, is obtained from equation (13) as: 
 1  h( 1y – ––   – b1 +  1s2) –  1y +   + b1  2 s1(s2, h) = ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– (19)
 1
The budgetary cost of alump-sum guarantee intervention, given as afunc-
tion of  h and g2, is obtained by substituting g1(g2,  h) from (18) and  1
* = 1
from (8), into (15): 
 1                       1(1 –  2)
Gg =    h  1y – ––   – b1 + –––––––– g2  –  1y +   + b1  +
 2                               2
+ (1 –  ) h(1 –  2)g2
 1 =    h  1y – ––   – b1  –  1y +   + b1  +
 2
 1(1 –  2)
+   h –––––––– g2 + (1 –  ) h(1 –  2)g2  2
The budgetary cost of an interest-rate subsidy, given as a function of  h
and s2, are obtained by substituting  1
* = 1 from (12) and s1(s2,  h) from (19),
into (16): 
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 1 =    h  1y – ––   – b1  –  1y +   + b1  +   h 1s2 + (1 –  ) h 2s2  2
The comparison of the budgetary cost for the targeted lump-sum gua-
rantees and for the targeted interest rate-subsidies shows that: 
 1(1 –  2)
Gs – Gg =  h s2[  1 + (1 –  ) 2] – g2   –––––––– + (1 –  )(1 –  2)   > 0
 2 
 1 g2(1 –  2)   –– + 1 –     2                                   1 –  2 ⇔ s2 > –––––––––––––––––––– = g2 –––––
  1 + (1–  )  2                              2
So, it is intuitively plausible if s2 is sufficiently high relative to g2, then
Gs > Gg. This means that if the government is targeting support both to low-
and high-risk borrowers, the comparison of budget impacts of lump-sum
guarantees and interest-rate subsidies depends on the extent of support
provided directly to low-risk borrowers. The intervention with lower sup-
port targeted to low-risk borrowers will be cheaper for thegovernment’sbud-
get. 
For the optimal solution with s2 → 0, g2 → 0 we get lims2→0  Gs= limg2→0 Gg. 
For  2 → 0, the budgetary cost is given as: 
 1 lim G  =    h  1y – ––   – b1  –  1y +   + b1  ⇒ lim G  =  lim Gs = lim Gg  2→0  2                                                             2→0               s2→0             g2→0
For the optimum interventions with negligible volume of support targeted
to low-risk borrowers, the government is indifferent with regard to all three
analyzed types of intervention as far as the impact of these interventions
on the government’s budget is concerned. 
In the case of lump-sum guarantees and interest-rate subsidies we can
also easily express g = g1 = g2 and s = s1 = s2: 
 1  2  h  1y – ––   – b1  – ( 1y–   – b1)   2 g( h) = –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(1 –  1) 2 –  h 1(1 –  2)
 1  h  1y – ––   – b1  – ( 1y–   – b1)
 2 s( h) = ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
 1(1 –  h)
The comparison of thecost of non-targeted lump-sum guarantees and non-
-targeted interest-rate subsidies shows that: 
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[ 2(1– 1) –  h 1(1– 2)][  1 + (1– ) 2 h] –  1 2(1– h)[ (1– 1) + (1– ) h(1– 2)]
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
 1(1– h)[ 2(1– 1) –  h 1(1– 2)]
 1                                                           ( 2 –  1) h[ 1  +  2(1– )]
=   h  1y – ––   – b1  – ( 1y–   – b1)  ––––––––––––––––––––––––
 2                                                        (1– h)[ 2(1– 1) –  h 1(1– 2)]
Since the denominator term (1– h)[ 2(1– 1) –  h 1(1– 2)] may be shown to
be positive, the entire fraction is positive. The sign of the difference (Gs–Gg)
therefore depends on the leading term [ h( 1y – rac 1 2  – b1) – ( 1y –   – b1)],
 1y– –b1
which is positive if  h > ––––––––––. This fraction is equal to the size of  
 1  1y– –– –b1  2
credit rationing in the absence of government intervention. Since in our
model any meaningful intervention leads to the decrease in the credit ra-
tion (meaning the increase in the  h), the leading term and the whole ex-
pression will be positive. Therefore (Gs–Gg) > 0. This argument also con-
firms that the formulas for uniform interventions  g( h) and s( h) derived
in this section take only positive values. The fact that the uniform interest
rate subsidies are more expensive than the uniform lump-sum guarantees
means that with thenon-targeted supports, thegovernment unambiguously
prefers lump-sum guarantees to interest-rate subsidies in minimizing
the budgetary cost.
7. Empirical Evidence
Our theoretical results may be compared with the empirical evidence of
the loan support provided by the operations of the Czech SGAFF. SGAFF
started with strong emphasis on guarantee provision (as witnessed by its
name, which has remained unchanged since the creation of SGAFF), when
the rate of guarantees was quite high, in some cases up to 100 % of the con-
tracted loan repayment. All the initial programs of SGAFF provided either
only guarantees or guarantees and subsidies. There was no program pro-
viding only interest-rates subsidies among the initial programs. The ex-
ception was only supplementary programs (Landscape, Youth, and Agro-re-
gion), which were designed as supplementary programs to be used by eligible
farmers only in conjunction with some of the principal programs. These sup-
plementary programs provided additional interest rate subsidies. 
After the first few years, both the rate of guarantees and the volume of
provided guarantees decreased relative to the provision of subsidies. This
quantitative evidence of a shift of emphasis to interest-rates subsidies was
quite consistent up to 2004. SGAFF’s decision to decrease the provision of
guarantees, which we discussed in Section2, was caused primarily by thein-
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the combined effects of the decrease of guarantees and better active ma-
nagement of its portfolio of defaulted loans, SGAFF managed to avoid
the danger of a massive wave of default connected with the huge guaran-
tee payments. Since 2001 SGAFF’s guarantee payments decreased to
the level prevailing before 1998. This created a favorable environment for
the revival of credit guarantees as a major part of SGAFF’s operations.
Therefore, 2004 saw the reversal of the trend of guarantees’decreasing role,
with greater emphasis placed on guarantees, as measured by the volume
of guarantees provided. 
By 2004 and 2005 the guarantees provided by SGAFF were usually up to
30 % of the contracted loan repayments, in some programs up to 50 %. This
means that they were still set more conservatively than in the first years
of SGAFF’s operations. Until 2004 non-investment loans were supported
only by interest-rate subsidies; currently they are supported by both sub-
sidies and guarantees. Among the investment-loan programs, three of them
provide both interest-rate subsidies and guarantees, one provides only sub-
sidies and one provides only subsidies in some investment areas and both
subsidies and guarantees in other investment areas. 
One interesting feature of the Czech SGAFF guarantees is that, as op-
posed to the guarantees provided by commercial banks, they do not require
any guarantee fee. What is even more intriguing, the question of guaran-
tee fees was never raised in any of the many discussions concerned with
SGAFF. In the case of the 2006 termination of the government’s budget con-
tribution to SGAFF becoming permanent, the only possibility to continue
operation of SGAFF guarantee activities will be to modify them along
the lines used by commercial banks’ guarantee programs. The inclusion of
some simple guarantee fee into our model then may be relatively straight-
forward and our model may be used for the analysis of those modified gua-
rantees too. 
8. Conclusions
In our paper we have described the Czech SGAFF institution of agricul-
tural credit support. We have shown the evolution of its activities, funding,
and outlays over time. Our empirical analysis shows that while both its ab-
solute volumes and its relative importance in total government support to
agriculture decreased after 2000 as compared to second half of 1990s, it still
remains an important institution of agricultural credit support. It is likely
to remain active at the current level at least until the end of 2006. 
We have shown that the value of the SGAFF portfolio is sufficiently high
to cover the expected costs of credit guarantees and subsidies provided by
SGAFF so far. In principle, our simple estimation of expected costs of credit
guarantees could be done much more extensively using option-pricing tech-
niques. The explicit theoretical analysis of the possibilities of using option
pricing for valuation of SGAFF guarantees is provided by Janda and Levin-
sky (1996). But actual careful implementation of these techniques with
the discussion of all relevant assumptions to the SGAFF data have not yet
been carried out and it remains an interesting topic for future research. 
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a theoretical model. We started from the idea that the government’s credit
support may decrease the inefficiencies caused by credit rationing based on
lender’s incomplete information about the quality of the farmers. We in-
troduced the government interventions – credit guarantees and interest-
-rate subsidies – modeled according to their Czech empirical counterparts.
Our analysis was based on the comparison of direct budgetary costs re-
quired by different types of interventions for a given reduction of credit ra-
tioning. 
Our analysis has shown that as long as the government is perfectly tar-
geting its interventions to disadvantaged high-risk farmers with the goal
of reducing credit rationing caused by asymmetric information, the consi-
dered types of interventions are perfectly equivalent from the point of view
of direct government budgetary costs. If the government provides support
both to low- and high-risk farmers, then the comparison of lump-sum gua-
rantees and interest-rate subsidies depends on the extent of support pro-
vided to low-risk farmers. If the subsidy rates provided to these efficient
farmers are sufficiently high relative to the lump-sum guarantees provided
to these farmers, then the budgetary costs are higher for subsidies. As long
as credit support is provided uniformly to all types of farmers, the govern-
ment unambiguously prefers lump-sum guarantees to interest-rate subsi-
dies in minimizing budgetary costs. 
Our qualitative theoretical results have mixed empirical-evidence sup-
port. Since the currently used guarantees and subsidies are uniform, our
model predicts that the most efficient way for the government to decrease
credit rationing is to prefer guarantees over subsidies. This is what hap-
pened in the evolution of the Czech SGAFF fund during the first years of
its operations and what seems to have been happening again recently. In
the intervening years of the evolution of SGAFF, the fear of uncertainty con-
nected with extended guarantees was stronger than our intuitively plausi-
ble theoretical argument and SGAFF curbed the provision of these gua-
rantees. The successful management of guarantees and defaulted loans by
the end of the 1990s and by the beginning of this century was probably
the most important factor leading to the current renaissance of the SGAFF
credit guarantees. 
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SUMMARY
JEL classification: D82, G28, P31
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An Analysis of the Cost of the Supporting 
and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund
(SGAFF) in the Czech Republic
Karel JANDA – Transgas-RWE Chair in Economics and Department of Microeconomics and Mathematical
Methods, Charles University, Prague and Department of Banking and Insurance, University of
Economics, Prague (Karel-Janda@seznam.cz)
The paper analyzes the cost to the Czech state budget of the Supporting and Gua-
rantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund (SGAFF). In the empirical part of the paper,
the author shows that the SGAFF portfolio has sufficient value to cover the expec-
ted costs of the credit guarantees and subsidies offered by the fund. The theoreti-
cal model looks at government interventions designed to decrease the credit ratio-
ning of farmers with high probability of success. The theoretical model shows that,
with uniform non-targeted supports, the Czech government unambiguously prefers
lump-sum guarantees to interest-rate subsidies. With support targeted wholly to dis-
advantaged farmers, the cost of lump-sum guarantees, proportional guarantees, and
interest-rates subsidies are all equal.
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